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TAXATION
During this survey period the Tenth Circuit considered only
a limited number of cases involving federal taxation. Due to the
relatively Small number of cases and to make the survey of this
area as complete as possible most of these cases will be discussed.'
2
Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Commissioner
presented three issues concerning the taxation of insurance companies: (1) Are unpaid premiums (including deferred premiums
and due and unpaid premiums) and the loading portions of these
premiums, assets of a life insurance company;3 (2) are unpaid
premiums, including their loading portions, to be included within
a life insurance company's underwriting income;' and, (3) are
purchased blocks of cancellable accident and health insurance
policies amortizable over their useful lives? 5
With respect to the first issue, the Tenth Circuit, contrary to
the decisions of four other circuits, held that unpaid premiums
This overview will deal only with cases involving federal tax questions; it will not
discuss those cases that may have arisen in a tax setting but were decided under principles
of other areas of the law. All citations to the Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 as amended; all citations to sections refer to sections of the Code.
2 525 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1975), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1077
(1974), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 814 (1976).
1 In 1958 Standard did not include unpaid premiums in computing its assets under
section 805. In 1959 and 1961 Standard included in its assets only the net valuation
premium and excluded loading with respect to unpaid premiums. 525 F.2d at 787.
1 In 1958, 1959, and 1961, Standard claimed deductions for increases in loading in
computing gain from operations under section 809. Id. at 787-88.
1 Standard bought blocks of policies from other insurance companies. Id. at 788.
"Unpaid premiums" fall into two categories, namely, "deferred premiums" and "due
and unpaid premiums." Deferred premiums are those premiums on policies with installment payments which become due after December 31 but prior to the policy's anniversary
date. Due and unpaid premiums are those premiums which are due but unpaid before the
end of the year. "Loading" is the amount added to the "net valuation premium" (the
amount necessary to provide the policy's benefits under applicable mortality tables) in
order to cover acquisition and management costs, operating expenses, commissions, profits, and dividends. Together, the loading amount and the net valuation premium comprise
the "gross premium" or the amount charged the insured for carrying his particular risk.
527 F.2d at 787. These definitions were adopted by the Tax Court in Bankers Union Life
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 661, 663 (1974).
State and federal insurance regulations required Standard to compute most of its
policies' reserves as if all of the premiums on these policies were paid a year in advance,
although this is rarely true; reserves are treated as a liability to an insurance company
and figure into the computation of assets under section 805 and gain from operations under
section 809. I.R.C. §§ 805(a), 805(b)(4), 809(c)(2).
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are not to be included in the calculation of assets under section
805.6 The applicable Treasury regulation, to the extent that it
required these unpaid premuims to be treated as assets, was invalidated by the Tenth Circuit.7 The reasoning underlying the
decisions of the other four circuits did not persuade the Tenth
Circuit because those cases were based upon the fiction that the
annual premiums were received in full and upon the simple desire
to achieve uniformity in accounting for reserves and unpaid
premiums.' The Tenth Circuit noted that the other circuits had
failed to distinguish the fact that, while reserves are required by
state law in order to protect policy holders, "income taxes are,
uniformly, owing on income actually earned. 9 The Tenth Circuit
held that unpaid premiums are not section 805(b)(4) assets because the insurance company has no enforceable right to them.
Nor does the insurance company have a right to due but unpaid
premiums; non-payment of premiums only causes the policy to
lapse. 10
With respect to the second issue, the Tenth Circuit held that
unpaid premiums were not includable in premium income under
section 809(c)(1) because premium income under that section
includes only those premiums to which an insurance company
has a legally enforceable right."
The Tenth Circuit, with respect to the third issue, agreed
with the Tax Court that purchased blocks of cancellable accident and health insurance policies may be amortized over their
I Among the cases holding that unpaid premiums must be included in assets under
section 805 are: Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 460 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1974); Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner,
432 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1970); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d
842 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828 (1969); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
399 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1118 (1969).
' Treas. Reg. § 1.805(a)(4)(ii) (1960). The pertinent part was inconsistent with the
underlying statute and therefore void. 525 F.2d at 789-90. United States v. Correll, 389
U.S. 299 (1967); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
525 F.2d at 789.
Id. (emphasis in original). '"Potential profitability' should not give rise to a tax."
Id.
525 F.2d at 790 & n.4.
Id. at 791. The court also invalidated Treas. Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(1)(i) (1960) insofar
as it applied to unpaid premiums in which an insurance company has no legally enforceable right. 525 F.2d at 791.
"1 Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 807, 839 (1975).
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useful life if the record discloses facts from which a reasonable
estimate of useful life can be made,' 3 but held that in this case
there could be no amortization because the record did not disclose
sufficient facts from which such a reasonable estimate could be
made."
In Pepsi-ColaBottling Co. v. Commissioner,'5 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision concerning the reasonableness
of compensation payments made by a closely held corporation to
an employee who was also a majority stockholder. In 1956 the
corporation and Mrs. Joscelyn, its majority stockholder and an
employee, entered into a contingent compensation agreement.' 6
Pursuant to this agreement, the corporation (taxpayer) paid her
$67,187 in 1968, $88,457 in 1969, and $97,552 in 1970. The Tax
Court held that $50,000, $54,500, and $57,500 respectively were
reasonable and properly deductible under section 162(a)(1).' 7
In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit
stated that the reasonableness of a given amount of compensation
is a question of fact to be determined by an examination of all
the evidence. Therefore, a trial court's decision on this question
will not be upset unless it is found to be clearly erroneous.' 8 Eschewing any rigid rules for making these determinations, the
Tenth Circuit outlined some of the factors to be considered, including the fact that the compensation agreement was entered
into between a closely held corporation and its stockholders.'"
"

525 F.2d at 791.

" Id. at 791-92. Judge McWilliams dissented on the first two issues.

, 528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1976).
" The agreement basically provided that Mrs. Joscelyn, who was president and general manager and held 248 of the outstanding 250 shares of stock, would receive a salary
of $6,000 per year plus an annual bonus of 10% of the first $10,000 of net income, 20% of
the next $10,000, and 30% of the net income over $29,000. The years in question were 1968
through 1970. 528 F.2d at 178 & n.1.
" Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 564, aff'd, 528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir.
1976). A fortiori, payments that exceed the reasonable level of compensation (most often
considered dividends in disguise) are not deductible. See, e.g., Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Commissioner, 503 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1974); Carole Accessories, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32
T.C.M. (CCH) 1285 (1973).
" 528 F.2d at 179.
" Id. The factors listed by the Tenth Circuit were:
1. The employee's qualifications.
2. The nature, extent and scope of the employee's work.
3. The size and complexities of the business.
4. A comparison of salaries paid with the gross income and the net income.
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The Tenth Circuit did not discuss each of the factors it listed.
Instead, it focused upon the fact that the taxpayer had never
made a distribution or paid a dividend. It noted: "The nonpayment of a dividend in conjunction with a contingent scheme
for a controlling shareholder has frequently been recognized as an
indication that unreasonable and excessive compensation is being
paid."20

At the trial and on appeal, the corporation attempted to
justify the payments on the basis of the "reasonable when made,
reasonable when paid" rule. This rule states that if a contingent
compensation agreement is both reasonable when made and the
product of a free bargain between the employer and the employee,
then compensation will be reasonable when paid, although it is
in excess of what is normally considered a reasonable amount.2 '
The Tenth Circuit, affirming the Tax Court, refused to apply this
rule, stating: "[Tihe premise of the regulation is a free bargain
made solely for the purpose of securing the services of the employee.

22

In Pepsi, there was no free bargain for two reasons: (1)

The bargain was between Mrs. Joscelyn as employee and herself
as the corporation's controlling shareholder; and (2) the bargain
was not made for the purpose of securing Mrs. Joscelyn's services,
since, as controlling stockholder, she would probably have provided the services without the agreement.2 3 With respect to the
5. The prevailing general economic conditions.
6. A comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders.
7. The prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns.
8. The salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees.
9. In the case of small corporations with a limited number of officers the
amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in previous years.
This list of considerations originated in Magson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115
(6th Cir. 1949).
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit stated that "special scrutiny should be given to
compensation paid by a corporation whose stock is closely held." 528 F.2d at 179 (citing
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d
45 (10th Cir. 1967)).
" 528 F.2d at 183 (citing Pacific Grains, Inc. v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 603, 607 (9th
Cir. 1968); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 45, 48 (10th Cir. 1967); Logan Lumber
Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir. 1966); Long Island Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940)). The implication of
such an arrangement is that the profits are being distributed disguised as compensation.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2) (1954) for the IRS's statement of the rule.
22 528 F.2d at 181.
23

Id.
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second reason the Tenth Circuit said: "A bonus contract that
might be reasonable if executed with an executive who is not a
controlling shareholder may be viewed as unreasonable if made
stockholder
with a controlling shareholder, since incentive to the
24
to call forth his best effort would not be needed."

In Medco Products Co. v. Commissioner,5 the Tenth Circuit
affirmed a Tax Court decision"6 holding that the legal expenses
incurred by Medco in bringing a trademark infringement suit2
must be capitalized and could not be deducted as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under section 162. The court stated:
"The origin and character of the claim for which an expense was
incurred determines whether it is a deductible business expense.

'2

The general rule is that any expense which produces

benefits lasting more than one year must be capitalized and cannot be fully deducted in the year incurred.29 In Medco the expenses were definitely business related but produced benefits that
would last more than one year. The expenses were "capital in
nature"; they were not incurred in the operation of the business,
and they were not ordinary and necessary in relation to the marketing of electrical therapeutic equipment.3
The Tenth Circuit found support for its decision in section
177, under which a taxpayer may elect to treat expenses incurred
24 Id.

at 182.

- 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975).
2S Medco Products Co. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 509 (1974).
" Medco, an Oklahoma corporation, had been marketing electrical therapeutic
equipment under its trademark since 1955. In 1966 Medco learned that an Illinois corporation was marketing similar products under the name Medco. In a trademark infringement
suit, Medco was awarded $1,000 in damages. Medco Products Co. v. Medco Hosp. Supply
Corp., 287 F. Supp. 884 (N.D. Il. 1968).
" 523 F.2d at 138 (citing United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963)). The issue in
Gilmore was whether the expense was business or personal. However, in Woodward v.
Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), the issue was whether fees incurred in an appraisal
action were capital expenditures or deductible business expenses under section 212. There,
the Supreme Court refused to adopt a "primary purpose" test (taxpayer's primary purpose
for incurring the expense determines deductibility) and affirmed the origin of the claim
test.
. 523 F.2d at 138.
" Id. at 139. See Commissioner v. Polk, 276 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1960); Okemah Nat'l
Bank v. Wiseman, 253 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1958); Hales-Mullaly v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d
509 (10th Cir. 1942). Similar results were reached in Georator Corp. v. United States, 485
F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1973), and in Danskin, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1964). Since legal expenses in a trademark action made the taxpayer's property more
secure they were capital, not ordinary and necessary, expenses. 523 F.2d at 139.
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in connection with trademarks and tradenames as deferred expenses and pro rate them over a five-year period. The Treasury
regulation under section 177 includes legal fees; therefore, the
court reasoned, Congress did not intend such fees to be deducted
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Since Medco did
3
not elect section 177 the expenses must be capitalized. '
In Brown v. Commissioner,32 the Tenth Circuit, following the
lead of the Second, 33 Sixth, 34 and Seventh 35 Circuits, declared that

payments in satisfaction of alleged but unproven liability under
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 3 must be
treated as long term capital loss rather than an ordinary and
necessary business expense. Mr. Brown was employed by Western
Nuclear Inc. (Western) as vice president and treasurer. Between
January and May of 1966 he sold 3,000 shares of Western stock
in order to raise the cash needed to exercise employee stock purchase options on 16,000 shares which he purchased within the
prohibited six-month period. Gain on the sale of the 3,000 shares
was reported as long term capital gain. In 1968 a shareholder
brought suit to recover the short swing profits. Mr. Brown did not
contest the suit but paid Western the full amount of recoverable
damages. Mr. Brown had no inside information; his only motive
for not fighting the suit was a desire to avoid adverse publicity
and embarrasment to himself and Western, and to prevent harm
37
to his business reputation.

38
The Tax Court, relying on three of its previous decisions,
5' 523 F.2d at 140.
529 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'g 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300 (1973).
Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 61 T.C. 1 (1973),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
" Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g 52 T.C. 170 (1969),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev 'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). This section is designed to prevent the unfair use of
inside information by corporate directors and officers. It provides that any profit realized
by a director, officer, or beneficial owner on the purchase and sale or sale and purchase of
his company's stock within six months (commonly referred to as "short swing profits")
may be recovered in an action brought by the corporation or a shareholder on behalf of
the corporation.
3 The repayment was originally reported as a long term capital loss, but in an
amended return it was deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 529 F.2d
at 610-11.
Cummings v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 91, aff'd on rehearing,61 T.C. 1 (1973), rev'd,
506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); Anderson v. Commissioner,
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stated that the only issue was whether Mr. Brown made the repayment to protect his employment and his business reputation.
Finding this to be Brown's motive, the Tax Court held that the
payment was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense." The Tenth Circuit accepted the Tax Court opinion
40
as to Mr. Brown's motive but held that the tax benefit rule
applied, and, therefore, the repayment had to be treated as a long
term capital loss."
In Gardinerv.United States, 2 Ms. Gardiner (taxpayer) had
bought depreciable property but failed to take the allowable depreciation deductions for 1964, 1965, and 1966; she did, however,
take deductions for later years. When the property was sold in
1971, the taxpayer did not reduce her basis by the amount of the
depreciation she could have deducted in 1964-66. The taxpayer
reported a loss on the sale, but the IRS reduced the property's
basis by the amount of depreciation that could have been claimed
and determined that the sale produced a gain. The taxpayer's
refund claim for the amounts she failed to deduct was disallowed
by the IRS because it was not timely filed.' 3 In a refund action
the trial court found for the government."
At trial and on appeal the taxpayer contended that the mitigation sections of the Code, sections 1311-1315, would allow the
56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973); William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C.
170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970).
" Brown v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300, 1302 (1973).
0 The rule was announced in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), and
United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969). Basically, the rule states that if a
taxpayer was taxed at lower than the ordinary income rate when the money was received,
he cannot be allowed to take a deduction against an ordinary income when the money is
repayed. It would be an unfair tax "windfall" if the taxpayer were allowed to fully deduct
the repayment.
" 529 F.2d at 612-13. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the tax benefit
rule should not apply because Brown was acting in separate capacities when he sold the
stock and when he repaid the profits. Section 16(b) liability focuses on both relationships
of stockholder and employee. 529 F.2d at 612-13. The court also rejected an argument
based upon bifurcating the transaction into a stock sale and a separate section 16(b)
problem. Mr. Brown sold stock in order to exercise the option; all the events in the
transaction must be considered together. 529 F.2d at 614.
,2536 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1976).
,' Refund claims must be filed within three years from the time the return is filed, or
two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. I.R.C. § 6511(a).
" Gardiner v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Utah 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 903
(10th Cir. 1976).
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case to be reopened although the statute of limitations had run.
This argument was based principally on sections 1312(1) and
1312(7). Section 1312(1) applies when the IRS or a court requires
inclusion in gross income of an item that was erroneously included in gross income in a prior year. The court found that the
failure to take allowable depreciation deductions did not constitute an erroneous inclusion in a prior year and thus section
1312(1) was not applicable.4 5 Furthermore, the court stated:
The meaning of an item of gross income is, under Section 61 of
the 1954 Code, limited to specific items and does not include everything that results in an increase in tax. It is restricted to positive
items and does not include negative elements such as deductions
(like depreciation), the omission of which results in increased
taxes."

Section 1312(7) permits a case to be reopened when, with
respect to transactions affecting basis, certain enumerated errors
have been made. The key word is "transaction"; if there is no
transaction, the section does not apply. The Tenth Circuit found
that the failure to take an allowable depreciation deduction did
not constitute a transaction for purposes of section 1312(7)" 7 as
the word "transaction" means a business transaction in the ordinary sense and not the failure to make an entry on the books.48
Furthermore, the failure to take the deduction was not an errroneous charge to the capital account of an item that should have
been deducted, and, therefore, section 1312(7)(c)(iii) did not
apply.49
Should a state court determine whether a transfer is a taxable event under federal law? This was the ultimate question
presented in Imel v. United States.50 The federal tax issue was
whether a transfer of appreciated property by a husband to his
former wife, pursuant to a divorce settlement, was a nontaxable
division of property between co-owners or a transaction giving rise
,1 536 F.2d at 906.

Id. (emphasis in original). The court viewed depreciation as a deduction from gross
income and not as an element in the calculation of gross income. Id.
1, 536 F.2d at 907. See also, United States v. Rushlight, 291 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1961);
Granger v. United States, 3 A.F.T.R.2d 59-319 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
536 F.2d at 907.
Id. at 907-08.
523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975), aff'g 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
4
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to taxable capital gains.' The Tenth Circuit, relying on a Colorado Supreme Court case holding that under Colorado law the
wife has an interest in her husband's property which vests at the
time the divorce action is filed, decided that the transfer was a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners.52 Determination of the federal issue in Imel depended upon the nature of the
wife's interest in jointly acquired property held in the husband's
53
name. This issue was decided by the Colorado Supreme Court.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit did not question the correctness of
the state court determination. The court's opinion focused on
the propriety of accepting the state court decision as controlling. 5
", See

I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1002.

2 Pursuant to COLO. App. R. 21.1, the federal district court certified questions of state

law to the Colorado Supreme Court. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102, 1116 (D.
Colo. 1974). In In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 184 Colo.
1, 517 P.2d 1331 (1974), the Colorado Supreme Court stated that "under Colorado law,
the transfer involved here was a recognition of a 'species of common ownership' of the
marital estate by the wife resembling a division of property between co-owners." Id. at 8,
517 P.2d at 1334. The transfer was not made to release the husband from an independent
obligation to support the wife. Id. at 9, 517 P.2d at 1334.
The Tenth Circuit felt that the district court had not abused its discretion in asking
the Colorado Supreme Court to determine the issue of ownership under Colorado law. 523
F.2d at 857. The Supreme Court has recently stated that use of certification procedures
"rests in the sound discretion of the federal court." Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,
391 (1974). Furthermore, certification is "particularly appropriate" when the question is
novel or the law unsettled. Id. The Tenth Circuit did feel that it was improper for the
district court to ask the Colorado court whether the transfer was a taxable event for federal
income tax purposes. 523 F.2d at 857. The Colorado Supreme Court expressed a similar
feeling and declined to answer that question. In re Questions Submitted by the United
States District Court, 184 Colo. 1, 8, 517 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1974). One author has concluded
that there was Colorado law for the district court to follow and, therefore, use of certification procedures was improper. Note, Should State Courts Determine FederalTax Policy?,
47 U. COLO. L. Rxv. 533, 541 (1976).
' In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 184 Colo. 1, 517
P.2d 1331 (1974). The district court made its own analysis of Colorado law and reached
the same conclusion as the state court. Although the district court had difficulty defining
the exact nature of the wife's interest, it felt it was a "species of common ownership." 375
F. Supp. at 1115.
" For this reason the validity of the decision is not discussed. For a thorough analysis
of the wife's interest and the correctness of the state and district court opinions, see Note,
FederalTaxation of Divorce Property Settlements and the Amiable Fictions of State Law,
52 DEN. L.J. 799 (1975); See also Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax
Policy?, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 533 (1976).
11523 F.2d at 855. The Government argued that the wife's interest as defined by the
Colorado Supreme Court was not within the concept of common ownership for federal tax
purposes and that under United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), taxability of the
transaction should be determined with reference to the wife's right during the marriage
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In the leading case on taxation of marital property settlements,
United States v. Davis,5" the United States Supreme Court, without the benefit of a state supreme court decision on point, applied
its own analysis of Delaware law and found the transfer taxable. 7
In Pulliam v. Commissioner,5" the Tenth Circuit, in a similar
situation, found that such transfers in Colorado were taxable."
However, a line of cases after Pulliam indicates that when a state
supreme court has determined the nature of the wife's interest in
marital property, a federal court should use that interpretation
in deciding whether a taxable transfer occurred. 0
In Collins v. Commissioner (Collins )," the Tenth Circuit
had found no significant differences between Colorado and Oklahoma law and therefore relied on Pulliam to find a similar transfer taxable in Oklahoma. Then, in Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Conand not upon divorce. The Tenth Circuit did not read Davis as determining when the
wife's interest had to vest before the division would be nontaxable. 523 F.2d at 856.
As a general rule, federal law determines which legal rights and interests shall be
taxed, whereas state law controls the creation of these interests and rights. Taxation,
however, does not depend upon labels placed on interests by state law. Instead, the courts
must look behind the labels to the "economic reality" of the situation and determine if
Congress sought to tax the particular transaction involved. 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

§§ 61.01-02, at 1-3 (1970). See also Commissioner v. Estate of

Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Moryan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940). For an argument
that Congress did not intend to tax the type of transfer involved in Imel, see Note, Should
State Courts Determine Federal Tax Policy?, U. COLO. L. Rlv. 533, 548-51 (1976).
370 U.S. 65 (1962).
5 Referring to DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1531(a) (1953), the Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by the
Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership. The
wife has no interest-passive or active-over the management or disposition
of her husband's personal property. Her rights are not descendable, and she
must survive him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the
marriage she shares in the property only to such extent as the court deems
"reasonable."
370 U.S. at 70.
329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964). The Tenth Circuit, using
its own interpretation of Colorado law, determined that the wife did not have a vested
interest in her husband's property and declared that a transfer pursuant to a divorce
decree was a taxable event. Id.
11 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit used its own analysis of Kansas law to find such
transfers taxable. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
996 (1974).
" In Davis, the Supreme Court stated that its decision "may permit different tax
treatment among the several States." 370 U.S. at 71. In Wiles the Tenth Circuit said,
"Davis requires us to follow Kansas law." 499 F.2d at 259.
El 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.), vacated, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
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mission (Collins 11),61 a case dealing with the state capital gains
tax involved in the same transaction, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court found that the wife's interest was a species of common
ownership; thus, the transfer was not taxable. The Supreme
Court, in a one paragraph per curiam opinion, 3 reversed Collins
I and remanded it for reconsideration in light of Collins 11.6 1 The
Collins III remand must have indicated to the Tenth Circuit that
the Supreme Court felt that the state's characterization of the
wife's interest, if available, should be controlling.
By declaring that the wife has an interest in her husband's
property which vests upon the filing of a divorce action, the Colorado Supreme Court created federal income tax advantages for
some of the citizens of the state.6 5 Imel is based upon the general
rule that state court interpretations of state law control. It fails,
"446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
0 Collins v. Commissioner (Collins Il), 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
11 On remand, the Tenth Circuit followed the Oklahoma Supreme Court's interpretation of the law and found the transfer to be a nontaxable division of property between coowners. Collins v. Commissioner (Collins IV), 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
" Whether or not a taxpayer will find an "advantage" in Imel depends on his point
of view. The maxim "taxes postponed are taxes saved" is not a sufficient analysis of the
situation. When appreciated property is transferred to an ex-spouse pursuant to a divorce
settlement, the transferee may do one of two things: make a living transfer of the property
or keep it until death.
In a "division of property" jurisdiction, while the transferor would pay no income tax
on the transfer, his basis will be carried over to the transferee. On a subsequent sale, the
transferee would be obliged to pay tax on the total appreciation, including that which
occurred prior to the divorce. In a "taxable event" jurisdiction the transferor in effect
satisfies his marital obligations with appreciated property and must pay income tax on
the amount by which the fair market value on the date of the transfer exceeds his basis.
The transferee's basis in the property will be its fair market value on the date of the
transfer. On a subsequent sale the transferee spouse would be taxed only on the postdivorce appreciation. Therefore, when the transferred property is subsequently sold the
transferee would seem to fare better in a "taxable event" state.
If the transferee makes an intervivos gift of the property, any gift tax due would be
based on the fair market value of the property on the date of the gift and the donee's basis
would be that of the donor, increased by any gift tax paid. Like the transferee who sells
the property, the transferee who gives it away (and the donee) fares better in a "taxable
event" jurisdiction because the burden of at least part of the appreciation is placed on
the transferor.
If the transferee holds the property until death, he will not pay income tax on the
appreciation regardless of the local rule. However, because of the new carryover basis rules
for inherited property, there could be different income tax consequences to the transferee's
heirs or legatees, depending on the local rule. This situation is analogous to those involving
gifts, mentioned above: The higher the transferee's basis, the lower the amount of income
tax due to appreciation when the heir disposes of the property. Apparently, the only people
who will benefit from Ime! are transferors.
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however, to consider the equally basic rule that, for federal tax
purposes, the state construction (or label) is not controlling, but
rather the true nature of the interest and the transaction must be
considered." However, once the Colorado Supreme Court decision was accepted by the Tenth Circuit as controlling, the result
in Imel easily followed.
In The J.E. & L.E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. v. United
States, 7 the J.E. and L.E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. (Foundation),
a tax exempt charitable organization, challenged a district court
decision"8 denying relief in a suit for refund of taxes paid on income produced by overriding royalty interests." Prior to 1969
such income was specifically excluded from taxation. This case,
however, involved the construction and application of the 1969
amendments.7 0
Prior to the amendments, a tax exempt corporation could, by
forming a subsidiary, indirectly engage in a business that would
" In tax cases the Supreme Court has frequently construed state law differently from
state courts, reflecting what the Court considered the "economic realities" of the situation. See, e.g., Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S.
103 (1932). 10 J. MEaRTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 61.02, at 3 (1970).
The Tenth Circuit refused to apply the holding of In re Questions Submitted by the
United States District Court to a case dealing with the taxability of the wife under sections
71 and 215. Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1975). The wife argued that
periodic payments, because of a pre-payment option, were really a tax free division of
property between co-owners as per the district and Colorado Supreme Court opinions in
Imel. The Tenth Circuit looked to the "true nature" of the payments and found them to
be in satisfaction of the husband's marital obligation, and not a division of property, even
though the payments "may be characterized by Colorado courts as a property settlement
...
Id. at 469. In Imel, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Hayutin "on the facts" and
because it dealt with "different provisions of the Code." 523 F.2d at 856. For views on the
nature of a Colorado spouse's right to a division of property upon divorce, see Note,
Federal Taxation of Divorce PropertySettlements and the Amiable Fictionsof State Law,
52 DEN. L.J. 794, 808-11 (1975); Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax
Policy?, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 540 (1976).
,7533 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1976).
,1J.E. & L.E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 673 (N. D.
Okla. 1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 The court stated: "Overriding royalty is a term used to determine the partition of
the lessee's interests in a mineral lease." 533 F.2d at 522.
In 1947 Mr. Mabee and his wife transferred oil and gas leases to the Mabee Petroleum
Corporation (Petroleum) which became a wholly owned subsidiary of the Foundation in
1948. Petroleum declared dividends in kind to the Foundation in the form of overriding
royalty interests in the leases. As a result Petroleum owned 20-30% and the Foundation
70-80% of the leasehold estate mineral interests. Id.
7oThe part of the Code in issue was section 512. 533 F.2d at 522-23.
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otherwise produce taxable income. The subsidiary would operate
the business but pay all the income to the parent in the form of
rents or royalties which were not taxed to the exempt parent
corporation. According to the House and Senate Reports, the
purpose of the amendment was to stop this practice.7
On appeal, the Foundation argued that the exclusion of overriding royalties from taxation in subsection 512(b)(2) was not
changed by the addition of subsection 512(b)(15) because that
subsection refers only to "royalties." The Tenth Circuit found
that "royalties" in subsection 512(b)(15) included overriding royalties and that the inclusion of "overriding royalties" in subsection 512(b)(2) was for clarification only and not intended as an
addition to the word royalties."
The court also rejected the argument that the Foundation's
overriding royalty income was not derived from the subsidiary
corporation as required by subsection 512(b)(15) because the income was paid directly to the Foundation by the purchasers and
not to the subsidiary corporation. The Tenth Circuit stated that
it was the intent of Congress to make this type of income taxable
and that a "mechanical formality" cannot be used to avoid that
result .13
In United States v. Russell,7" the United States brought a
debt action against the surviving widow of T.C. Russell, seeking
payment of federal estate taxes previously assessed against Mr.
Russell's estate. The major portion of the taxable estate consisted
of joint tenancy property which passed to Mrs. Russell outside of
probate and was, therefore, unavailable for the payment of taxes.
The tax was assessed against the estate but not against Mrs.
Russell personally.75 The only issue considered by the Tenth Circuit was whether a general tax lien pursuant to section 6321 could
1, H.R. REP. No. 91-413, Part 1, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1969); S. REP. No. 91-522,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969).
72 533 F.2d at 523. The fact that the words "overriding royalties" were not added
parenthetically to subsection 512(b)(15) did not indicate intent to exclude them from the
purview of that subsection. Id.
7 533 F.2d at 524.
532 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1976).
7' This was the second time this case came before the Tenth Circuit; the original case
was United States v. Russell, 327 F. Supp. 632 (D. Kan. 1971), rev'd, 461 F.2d 605 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972).
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arise against Mrs. Russell personally if an assessment had not
been made as required by section 6322.76
Mrs. Russell argued that no lien could arise without an assessment. The government contended that, since the estate was
properly assessed, a lien could arise against her because the transfer provisions of section 6324(a)(2) made the surviving tenant
personally liable for the unpaid tax. The district court and the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the government. The jointly held property was a part of the taxable estate; its value was included in
the assessment made against the estate even though the property
did not pass through probate and was not available to pay the
tax. In this situation a separate assessment against Mrs. Russell
was not required. Since the estate was properly assessed, the
transfer provisions did not impose any new obligation on Mrs.
Russell but merely facilitated the collection of an existing liabil77
ity.
7 8 Silver Bell
In Silver Bell Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,
Industries, Inc. (Silver Bell) owned mining claims which were
sold by the IRS to satisfy a lien for delinquent federal employment taxes. In the district court, 79 Silver Bell challenged the validity of the sale on several grounds and raised essentially the
same issues on appeal. Agreeing with the district court, the Tenth
Circuit found no merit in Silver Bell's arguments.
Section 6335(d) provides that tax sales shall take place
within the county where the property is located, unless the Secretary or his delegate issues a special order to the effect that the
sale shall take place elsewhere.80 The Tenth Circuit declared that
1, Section 6322 provides: "Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien
imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue
" (emphasis supplied).
until the liability for the amount so assessed. . . is satisfied ....
" The court seemed to place some weight on the fact that Mrs. Russell was also
executrix of the estate, which was insolvent, and that she therefore took the property fully
aware of the outstanding tax debt due. The court more than once referred to the particular
facts and circumstances of the case and concluded with the remark: "We deem it advisable to caution the Government that our affirmance in this instance should not be relied
upon for a like result in the event of failure by the proper officials to effect the assessment
lacking here." 532 F.2d at 177.
" No. 74-1641 (10th Cir., Feb. 19, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 822 (1976).
74-5682 (D. Colo. 1974).
" Silver Bell Indus. v. United States, 34 A.F.T.R.2d
The properties were located in San Miguel County but sold at an auction in Denver.
The criteria for issuing a special order are stated in Treas. Reg. § 301.6335-1(c)(1) (1954).
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this section required strict compliance and that a sale is invalid
if the procedures are not followed." The burden of showing literal
compliance with statutes regulating land sales for taxes rests with
the claimant under the sale." Even though no special order was
produced and the testimony raised a serious question as to its
existence, the Tenth Circuit did not invalidate the sale. The
claimants under the sale produced deeds reciting that the lands
were "sold as provided by Section 6335 . . . and the regulations
promulgated thereunder . . . ." Such a recital is prima facie
83
proof of the facts stated therein.
Silver Bell next argued that, prior to the filing of the lien, it
had paid all amounts due for the second quarter of 1971, and,
therefore, the seizure and sale for that period was invalid.8 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that, even if the payments had been
credited in the way Silver Bell had directed, there was still a
substantial sum due at the time of the sale. 5
In addition Silver Bell did not properly redeem the properties
from the government. Approximately three months after the sale,
Silver Bell paid the government enough to satisfy current liabilities and all but about $3,000 of the total amount owed. This was
viewed by the IRS as an overpayment of taxes. The Tenth Circuit
held that, even if the payment was applied toward redemption,
it was insufficient to redeem all the properties and the IRS was
under no duty to apply selectively the credit to redeem some of
the parcels.8
Essentially, the regulation requires the sale to take place in the county where the property
is seized, unless it appears to the district director authorizing the seizure that substantially higher bids may be obtained if the property is sold outside the county. Id.
No. 74-1641 at 5 (citing Thatcher v. Powell, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 119, 125 (1821)).
No. 74-1641 at 5 (citing McAndrews v. Belknap, 141 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1944)).
Section 6339(b). The Supreme Court has held that, in conjunction with a tax sale,
there is a rebuttable presumption that persons acting in public office have been duly
appointed and are acting with authority. Keely v. Saunders, 99 U.S. 441, 447 (1878). The
Tenth Circuit found that the presumption had not been overcome by Silver Bell. No. 741641 at 8. Silver Bell also challenged the revenue officer's authority to select the method
of sale used, which was public sale under sealed bids pursuant to section 6335(e)(2), and
his authority to issue certificates of sale under section 6338(a). Because Silver Bell did
not establish lack of authority at trial, the proceedings were presumed regular. No. 741641 at 8-9.
" Silver Bell made two payments in October, 1971, and directed that the payments
be applied to taxes owed for the second quarter, ending June 30, 1971. The IRS, however,
credited the payments toward third quarter liability. No. 74-1641 at 9.
Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 11-13 n.10.
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Silver Bell did not effect a timely redemption under the requirements of section 6337(b) by mailing personal checks to the
purchasers. The date of the sale was determined to be the date
of the publicly conducted auction, not the later date when the
offers to purchase were accepted by the Special Procedures Division of the IRS. Silver Bell had mailed the checks within the
statutory 120-day period but they were not received until the
121st day. Section 7502(a)(1)87 does not apply to articles mailed
to private parties, and, therefore, the general rule that payments
to creditors are effective upon receipt applied, making the at88
tempted redemptions untimely.
In Burns v. Commissioner,9 Mr. Burns received for services
rendered in 1966, 6,420 shares of Community National Life Insurance Company (Community National). 0 During the same year,
Mr. Burns sold 4,200 shares and reported their value on his income tax return at $33,520 and reported gain accordingly. The
Commissioner valued the shares at $71,542 and assessed a deficiency. In a petition to redetermine the deficiency, Mr. Burns
argued that the shares could not be valued at market because
they were subject to restrictions on sale." The Tax Court found
that there were no restrictions on sale and upheld the deficiency.
On appeal Mr. Burns challenged the sufficiency of the evidence behind the decision and contended that the Tax Court
erred as a matter of law in failing to make a specific finding of
the value of the shares on the dates received. The Tenth Circuit
stated that issues of valuation and the existence of sale restrictions were questions of fact and then applied the "not to be reversed unless clearly erroneous" standard. Although Rule 52 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to the Tax
Court, and Tax Court Rules do not require findings of fact and
conclusions of law, such findings and conclusions should be made
'7 This section provides that articles mailed to the IRS shall be considered delivered
on the date mailed.
" No. 74-1641 at 14-16.
" 36 A.F.T.R.2d 1 75-5341 (10th Cir. 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
0 Mr. Burns was in the business of arranging corporate mergers and acquisitions. He
received the Community National stock for helping Community National to acquire three
other insurance companies. Id. at 6236.
" The Commissioner's determination of market value was based upon comparable
sales of Community National stock. Id.
11Burns v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 977 (1974).
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to permit adequate review." It was clear from the opinion that the
Tax Court had determined the value of the shares on the dates
received." Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held that the record
supported the Tax Court finding that sale of the shares was not
restricted."
6 taxpayers
In Gates v. United States,"
brought an action to
obtain the refund of taxes, interest, and penalties paid for 1962
through 1968. Granting the government's motion for summary
judgment, the district court dismissed the action as to each tax
year. Taxpayers' appeals respecting 1962, 1963, and 1964 were
dismissed by the Tenth Circuit because their tax liability for
those years was fully adjudicated by the Tax Court" pursuant to
a petition to redetermine deficiencies." s The taxpayers' timely
refund claim for 1966 was dismissed because it failed to give the
government reasonable notice of the nature of the claim, a jurisdictional prerequisite." To be sufficient the claim must thoroughly apprise the IRS of the grounds upon which recovery is
sought. '0 The claims for 1967 and 1968 were rejected on the same
0 Bums v. Commissioner, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-5341 at 6236 (citing James Petroleum
Corp. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir. 1964)). The court recited the standard:
The basis for the decision however is not indicated in the findings or the
opinion, and this must appear. There is no way for us to determine whether
there is "substantial evidence" to support the findings if there are not findings on the specific facts concerned. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §
7482, states that the Court of Appeals shall review the decisions of the Tax
Court in the same manner and to the same extent as the decisions of the
District Courts. This requires complete findings of fact to demonstrate the
basis for the decision.
36 A.F.T.R.2d at 6236-37 (citations omitted). Section 7459(b) requires the Tax Court to
include in the report on any proceeding "its [written] findings of fact or opinion or
memorandum opinion." Rule 151 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure requires that briefs contain proposed findings of fact.
" See Bums v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 977, 979 (1974).
" Mr. Burns had testified that he orally agreed not to sell the shares without approval
and introduced a letter allegedly containing written restrictions. Neither the Tax Court
nor the Tenth Circuit found the letter convincing because Mr. Burns sold 65% of his
Community National stock in 1966 but argued that the letter prohibited him from selling
at all. Furthermore, in 1967 Mr. Burns had transferred a substantial number of shares
without mentioning any restrictions. 36 A.F.T.R.2d at 6237.
No. 75-1391 (10th Cir., Apr. 28, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Gates v. Commissioner, T.C. No. 5897-67 (Sept. 19, 1968).
" Final action by the Tax Court prohibits relitigation of the issues, for the years
involved, in a refund suit. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (1954).
' Herrington v. United States, 416 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1969). The refund claim for
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grounds. The claim for 1965 was dismissed because the plaintiff
failed to respond at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment to the government's affidavits that no refund claim for that
year could be discovered. The timely filing of a claim is jurisdictional, and the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate disputed
jurisdictional facts.
In Woods v. Commissioner'0 1 Woods, an inmate at Leavenworth Prison, filed a suit in district court requesting that a threejudge court be convened to declare section 107 unconstitutional.
This section provides the parsonage rental deduction. 02 The district court dismissed the action on the ground that Woods lacked
standing.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not consider the standing
issue0 3 but went directly to the merits. The court considered the
issue in one paragraph and, relying on the principles of Waltz v.
Tax Commission,'4 found that the tax exemptions extended by
section 107 did not violate the Establishment Clause. Because
there were no grounds on which to base a claim of unconstitutionality, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly
refused to convene a three-judge court. 10
Ward L. Van Scoyk
1966 (Form 843) stated the grounds for the refund: "$960.73 was illegally withheld after
the statue [sic] of limitations had run in addition to $721.04 previousely [sic] paid."
No. 75-1391 at 3-4.
I No. 75-1644 (10th Cir., Apr. 19, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 856 (1976).
I" Section 107 exempts from federal income taxation the rental value of living quarters furnished to ministers of the gospel as part of their compensation, or that part of
their compensation used to rent or provide a home. Woods argued that the section violated
the Establishment Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
0 On the authority of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Tenth Circuit recognized that taxpayer suits can be maintained in certain circumstances. The court noted,
however, that there was a serious question whether inmate Woods was a taxpayer in light
of certain statements he made in his pauper's affidavit, filed when the proceedings were
initiated. No. 75-1644 at 2.
1" 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Supreme Court stated, "There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion." Id. at 680. Tax exemptions to
churches do not violate the first amendment. Id. See also, Anderson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Swallow v. United States,
325 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 951 (1963).
'"I No. 75-1644 at 3. See generally Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); Saiz v.
Goodwin, 450 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1971); Firkins v. Colorado, 434 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.
1970); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970).

UPDATE

TO Second Annual Tenth Circuit Survey

The Denver Law Journal's second annual Tenth Circuit
Survey reviewed decisions handed down by the Tenth Circuit
between September 1, 1974 and August 31, 1975. Four of these
decisions were subsequently reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. The Court's holdings are briefly summarized below.
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association,
426 U.S. 776 (1976). In Flint Ridge Development Co.' the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit decision of Scenic Rivers
Association v. Lynn2 in an 8-0 opinion by Justice Marshall. The
Court held that, although the National Environmental Policy
Act 3 (NEPA) requires the filing of an environmental impact
statement where practicable, an impact statement in this case
was inappropriate because it clearly conflicted with authority
held by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act.' Compliance with the NEPA requirement would necessitate
extending the thirty-day mandatory effective date after filing of
the statement of record. Such extension is within the Secretary's
power only when the disclosure is found inadequate.
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). In Colorado River Water Conservation District,5 in a 6-3 opinion by Justice Brennan, the Supreme
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit decision of United States v.
Akin.' The Court held that the McCarran Amendment 7 did not
divest federal district courts of jurisdiction under section 1345 of
28 U.S.C.8 but gave consent to concurrent federal and state jurisdiction where federal water rights were at issue, including deter426 U.S. 776 (1976), rev'g 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975).
520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), discussed in 53 DEN. L.J. 223 (1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970), which requires developers to disclose to the secretary
information needed by potential buyers concerning unimproved tracts of land to prevent
false and deceptive sales practices.
424 U.S. 800 (1976), rev'g 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
6 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), discussed in 53 DEN. L.J. 225 (1976).
7 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), giving consent to join the United States as a defendant in
certain water rights adjudications.
I The statute provides for original jurisdiction in the district courts of all civil actions
brought by the United States unless otherwise provided by Congress.
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mination of water rights reserved for Indians, notwithstanding
the United States' fiduciary obligation to protect Indian rights.,
Moreover, the doctrine of abstention" was held inappropriate as
a ground for refusal to exercise jurisdiction in the federal court
since the doctrine applies only in special situations, none of which
were present in Akin.
However, the Court found other factors which clearly supported dismissal of the Government's suit and resolution of all its
water right claims by state court proceedings. Most significant
was the furtherance of the McCarran Amendment policy of encouraging unified adjudication of water rights for use of state
waters under state law, to avoid piecemeal litigation."
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426
2 the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
U.S. 1 (1976). In Train"
Circuit and held that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) was without authority to regulate the discharge of radioac3
tive materials into navigable waterways.
Respondents had sought a declaration that the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972's (FWPCA)
charged the EPA with controlling such discharges of radioactive
materials. Under the FWCPA it is illegal to discharge
"pollutants" into navigable waters without an EPA permit. The
act defines "pollutant" to include "radioactive materials." EPA
disclaimed any authority over radioactive discharges into navigable waterways in light of regulations, already issued by the Atomic Energy Commission"' pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of
1954,11 governing the discharge of such materials into waterways
by EPA licensees. In an 8-0 opinion by Justice Marshall, the
Court held that Congress had evinced no intent to diminish the
Atomic Energy Commission's control over discharges of source,
byproduct, and special nuclear materials, and, therefore, EPA's
424 U.S. 800, 809-12 (1976).
The Court calls the doctrine "the exception, not the rule." Id. at 813.
Id. at 818.
2 426 U.S.
1 (1976), rev'g 507 F.2d 743 (1974).
' For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit opinion, see 53 DEN. L.J. 228 (1976).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. IV 1974).
Now succeeded in its regulatory capacity by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5841(f), 5842 (Supp. IV 1974).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
"
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authority to regulate "pollutants" under the FWPCA does not
extend to such materials. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit in relying
on the "plain meaning" of the statute to construe its meaning had
erred in excluding the FWPCA's legislative history.
Salone v. United States, 426 U.S. 917 (1976). In Salone 7 the
Tenth Circuit held that a federal employee filing a civil action
under the Civil Rights Act of 196411 is entitled only to judicial
review of an administrative denial of a claim of discrimination
and is not entitled to a trial de novo.19 During the pendency of
Salone's petition for a writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court decided Chandler v. Roudebush, ° wherein a black
woman, like Salone, brought suit in federal court to challenge the
administrative denial of her discrimination claim. The Court held
in Roudebush that the plain meaning of the statute, reinforced
by the history of its 1972 amendments, compelled the conclusion
that federal employees have the same right to a trial de novo as
is enjoyed by a private sector or state government employee. In a
memorandum decision, Salone was vacated and the case remanded to the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of
Roudebush.2 '
W. Cecil Jones
"
"

21

511 F.2d 902 (1975), vacated mem., 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
See 53 DEN. L.J. 29 (1976).
425 U.S. 840 (1976).
426 U.S. 917 (1976).

